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In The S11preme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
VERL FARNSWORTH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
11126 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant, Verl Farnsworth, was convicted 
by a jury of second degree murder before the Hon-
orable Bryant H. Croft, Judge. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The defendant was tried, convicted and sen-
tenced as provided by law for the crime of murder 
in the second degree. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State asks this Court to affirm the judgment 
of the lower court on the basis that no reversible 
errors were committed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Brief of Appellant sets out the facts quite 
fairly. Any disagreement that the State has will be 
pointed out in the arguments that follow. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTION CORRECTLY IMPEACHED 
THE DEFENDANT WITH HIS OWN PRIOR VOLUN-
TEERED STATEMENTS. 
In the case at bar Ralph Whittaker ,a police of-
ficer with twelve years experience, was assigned to 
a radio patrol car on the day of the murder (TR. 89). 
He was flagged down by a lady waving her arms. 
This lady reported a man with a gun had either shot 
or was planning to shoot his son. 
Officer Whittaker proceeded to the scene of the 
shooting, made a quick examination and investiga-
tion, then placed the defendant under arrest. While 
defendant was in the police car havjng handcuffs 
placed on him, he made some statements (TR. 98). 
The defendant informed the police officer that there 
was no need for handcuffs because he wasn't going 
to hurt anybody. The defendant also commented 
that he had shot his son and wasn't sorry, but hoped 
the boy wouldn't die (TR. 99). 
Officer Whittaker then began transporting the 
defendant to the Salt Lake City Police Station. As 
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3 
they started towards the Police Station the defendant 
seemed very willing to talk (TR. 194). Because of this 
apparent willingness to talk, Officer Whittu.ker 
stopped the car and asked Officer Frisbey to wit-
ness the Miranda warning. At this time Officer Whit-
taker told the defendant that he had a right to re-
main silent and asked the defendant if he under-
stood this right. The defendant said he did. Then 
the defendant was told that anything he said could 
and would be used against him in court. The police 
officer again asked the defendant if he understood 
and again the defendant answered that he did un-
derstand. The defendant was then told of his right 
to have a lawyer with him while he was questioned 
and again the defendant stated he understood. Of-
ficer Whittaker then informed the defendant that if 
he could not afford an attorney one would be ap-
pointed before any questioning, and again the de-
fendant indicated his understanding of what was 
told him. 
Even after this careful warning given by an ex-
perienced policeman, the defendant again started 
to talk about the circumstances of the incident. The 
police officer then asked the defendant if by talk-
ing he was waiving his rights to an attorney and the 
defendant stated: "I guess I ought to talk to a lawyer 
before I make a formal statement, but l'll tell you what 
happened." (Emphasis added.) (TR. 193). After the de-
fendant made this statement the policeman did not 
interrogate nor ask questions about this matter. The 
officer's testimony was as follows: "Well, he was 
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disposed to talk and I just listened to what he had to 
say." (TR. 194). 
After Officer Whittaker and the defendant ar-
rived at the police station, custody of the defendant 
was given to Leonard Elton, a detective in the De-
tective Bureau. Detective Elton took the defendant 
into the Interrogation Ro0in in the Salt Lake County 
Jail and read the Miranda card to him. Defendant was 
then asked what happened and he started to tell 
them. A tape recording was taken (TR. 200). The de-
fendant did not ask for an attorney to be with him 
(TR. 200), nor did he tell the police that he wished 
to remain silent until an attorney was present (TR. 
202). 
The statements on this tape were later used to 
impeach the defendant's testimony (TR. 222). 
A 
STATEMENTS FREELY GIVEN DO NOT VIO-
LA TE MIRANDA V. ARJZON A. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 
694, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), the Supreme Court of the 
United States excluded all volunteered statements 
from its holding: 
"Volunteered statements of any kind are 
not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their 
admissibility is not affected by our holding to-
day." 384 U.S. at 473, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726. 
Many jurisdictions hold that the question is real-
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ly whether or not the statement given was solicited 
by the police. In State v. Law, 203 Kan. 89, 452 P.2d 
862 (1969), the Supreme Court of Kansas dealt with 
a case wherein the police officer advised the de-
fendan t of his rights and the defendant stated: "If 
I knew that you was going to pick me up this quick 
I would have had a gun." Id. 452 P.2d at 864. Tho 
court held that this statement was admissible, and 
stated: 
"The defendant's voluntary exclamation 
in connection with his arrest may not be said, 
in our judgment, to have been elicited by 
police officers either through solicitation or by 
means of investigatory questioning." Id. at 865 
A somewhat similar situation faced the Appel-
late Court of Illinois in People v. Savage, 242 N.E.2d 446 
(1968). In that case the defendant entered a sheriff's 
office and stated that he had murdered his wife. 
The deputies then took the defendant to the murder 
scene and advised him of his rights. He was then 
taken to the sheriff's office, where: 
". . . he was fully advised of his rights and 
was, in fact, given the name of the Public De-
fender. At this point, he stated that he wished 
to tell his story and to get it off his chest and 
made a detailed statement of the occur-
rence and the events leading up to it. Having 
been fully advised of his rights prior to making 
this statement, it was proper to admit it into 
evidence." Id. at 448, 449. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma 
also faced this question in Andrews v. State, Okl. ~r., 
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455 P.2d 741 (1969). In this case the defendant was 
placed in police custody at the scene of the crime 
and he, like the defendant in the case at bar, talked 
all the way to the station without being questioned 
by the transporing officer. However, in this case 
no Miranda warning was· given. The Court of Crim-
inal Appeals then cited the Miranda language which 
stated that volunteered statements were not affected 
by its holding, and said: 
"Under the circumstances of this case, we 
can only view the situation as being one in 
which the defendant volunteered his state-
ments, as described in that part of the Miranda 
opinion just recited." Id. at 744. 
The court then held that the testimony of the police 
officer was properly admitted. 
It would be strange indeed if the court were to 
find that had the Salt Lake City Police not given 
the Miranda warning, and had not questioned the de-
fendant, but merely listened to him (a person who 
seemed quite willing to talk), then the volunteered 
statements would be admissible, but since the Sal! 
Lake City Police were extra careful with this de- , 
fendant and warned him of his rights, those state· 
men ts he made voluntarily after mentioning that he 
ought to have an attorney, must be excluded from 
evidence. 
It was well put by the Trial Judge: 
"All right. I am not satisfied at all that his 
rights to counsel was misunderstood or that it 
was not intelligently waived. Here is a man 
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who apparently is anxious to talk to the Police 
and tell them what happened even to the point 
where the Officer taking him to the Police De-
partment stops in a street and gets another Of-
ficer to come over and listen to him give the 
warnings .... Now, if the Supreme Court wants 
to go that far, why let them tell us about it 
again. I think this cloak of protection that we 
throw over people that commit crimes will reach 
a limit and this case impresses me of being a 
good example. Where the Officers go just about 
as far as they ought to be required to go, but 
the man still tells them what he wants to tell 
them, so, I am not satisfied at all that the con-
fession itself if there were a confession or 
rather the statement he made to the Officer it-
self would be admissible if the Prosecution had 
attempted to put it in to begin with. In any 
event, they get him to the Police Station, they 
tell him this same thing and he goes ahead and 
talks to them. Now, there is no specific demand 
for a Lawyer, no request that a Lawyer be 
called or be present. He has been asked certain-
ly by Officer Whittaker at one point if he un-
derstands these rights and he said he did and 
yet he went ahead and chatted with him while 
he was taking him into the Station." (TR. 204, 
205). 
There is absolutely no valid claim in this case 
that the statements of the defendant were not vol-
unteered. 
B 
MIRANDA SAFEGUARDS CAN STOP INTER-
ROGATION MACHINERY, BUT THE DEFENDANT'S 
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CONDUCT OR STATEMENTS CAN START IT 
AGAIN. 
Even if this Court were to find that the defend-
ant's statement ("I guess I ought to talk to a lawyer 
before I make a formal statement, but I'll tell you 
what happened") were a request for counsel, the 
statements subseque:;-:tly made should still be ad· 
missible. 
Under Miranda the interrogation machinery must 
completely stop once the person requests the pres· 
ence of an attorney. This shut-down of the intemr 
gation process, however, is certainly not final. 
Actions or statements by the defendant can give 
the police the right to resume questioning. Once a 
person has requested counsel but continues to talk, 
the police are neither forced to remain quiet nor 
forced to stop listening. 
A California Court of Appeais was faced with 
a situation where a defendant was arrested, given 
the Miranda warning, and reqUested a lawyer indicat· 
ing his desire to remain silent. After being placed 
in jail the defendant asked his jailor if he could talk 
with Sergeant Neil. While in the .:nterrogation room 
Sergeant Neil again advised the defendant of his 
rights, but the defendant proceeded to make a 
statement which was taped and later used against 
him. The attorney for the defendant objected to this 
tape recording claiming that when the defendant 
asserted his rights he became permanently insulat· 
ed from subsequent interrogation and this precluded 
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the use of any elicited statements. The Court of Ap-
peals then commendably made the following ob-
servation of the correct rule: 
"We disagree with defendant's contention 
that an original invocation of rights requires 
permanent application of the no-interrogation 
rule regardless of any intervening act by the 
defendant. The rule explicitly affords insula-
tion, not from an interrogation conducted 
after a defendant has himself changed his mind, 
but instead from an interrogation conducted 
in order to change his mind. 
* * * 
We hold, therefore, that after defendant vol-
unteered to make a statement the police were 
entitled to interrogate him to the same extent 
as if he had initially so volunteered without hav-
ing invoked his rights." People v. Sunday, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 752 at 757 (1969). 
The only difference between the People v. Sunday 
case and the case at bar is the fact that the defend-
ant in Sunday was left in his cell alone for awhile. The 
rule set out by the court, however, is a good one. 
The only question that an appellate court should 
concern itself with is whether or not the defendant 
himself has changed his mind. 
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has also re-
cently faced this problem. In that case the defendant 
was taken into custody and had been given his 
rights. He requested an attorney before making a 
statement. At that time the officer giving the de-
fendant his rights read aloud the ballistics report on 
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a rifle and bullet. At that time the defendant con-
fessed to the crime. Later, on the stand, he stated 
that he had made no statement that would incrim-
inate him in the murder. The prosecution sought to 
show that he had orally confessed to the murder. 
The Court saw the issue as whether or not the de-
fendant' s confession was voluntary or coerced in 
violation of defendant's wishes to remain silent until 
he had the advice of counsel. The Court then cor-
rectly stated: 
"We hold that the evidence justified the 
trial court in finding that the appellant, after 
he had been effectively warned of his constitu-
tional rights, had voluntarily waived these 
rights after being informed that the ballistics 
report showed the bullet taken from the head 
of Mrs. Haden had been fired from the rifle that 
appellant was known to have sold shortly after 
Mrs. Haden's body was found. Appellant, him-
self, does not claim the police resorted to un-
lawful methods to coerce him to implicate him-
self in the crime. Appellant's own testimony 
was that he did not make any statement to 
Sergeant Babbs or to anyone else that would 
incriminate him in the murder. 
Under the facts and circumstances pre-
sented by this record we find that the trial 
court correctly admitted the alleged confession 
in evidence and therefore conclude that appel-
lant was given a fair trial." Combs v. Common· 
wealth, 438 S.W.2d 82 at 85 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1969). 
It is readily seen that in this case the defendant 
was at all times in the presence of policemen as was 
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the defendant at bar. The questions and answers 
between the officer and defendant in Combs were 
allowed in evidence and they should also be al-
lowed in the case at bar. 
In Bazzell v. State, 6 Md. App. 194, 250 A.2d 674 
(1969), the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
also faced the situation where one, advised of his 
rights, requested not to be interrogated and yet still 
confessed. In Bazzell the defendant was placed in 
jail and when an officer took lunch to the defendant, 
the defendant admitted breaking into two places. 
This admission was offered at trial and the trial judge 
allowed it. On appeal the Court said: 
"We find, therefore, that the statement 
here given was not the product of police inter-
rogation but was freely and voluntarily given. 
Under the circumstances, its admission was 
not in violation of any of the mandates of 
Miranda, supra." Id. 250 A.2d at 677. 
It is clearly evident that Miranda safeguards can 
stop the interrogation process, but when the de-
fendant is disposed to talk and does in fact talk, 
the police are not required to listen with deaf ears 
and remain completely silent. Therefore when Of-
ficer Whittaker gave the defendant his Miranda warn-
ing and the defendant continued to talk, his volun-
teered statements could and should be used against 
him. He had stated that he understood his rights, 
therefore his actions and statements should consti-
tute a waiver. 
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c 
STATEMENTS TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF 
MIRANDA MAY STILL BE USED TO IMPEACH A 
DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY. 
At this point several things should be pointed 
out to the court. First, the statements used by the 
prosecuion were not offered by the State except to 
challenge the credibility of the defendant. Second, 
the statements used by the prosecution were volun· 
tary, no claim to the contrary having been made. 
The language in the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States is designed to 
protect a person from being compelled "to be a wit· 
ness against himself .... " This is not a privilege "to 
lie with impunity once he [the defendant] elects 
to take the stand to testify." State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 
2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818 (1969). 
Note the following language by Justice Frank-
furter from Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S. Ct. 
354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954), which deals with inadmis· 
sible evidence under the Fourth Amendment ex-
clusionary rule: 
"It is one thing to say that the Govern-
ment cannot make an affirmative use of evi-
dence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another 
to say that the defendant can tum the illegal 
method by which evidence in the Government's 
possession was obtained to his own advantage, 
and provide himself with a shield against con-
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tradiction of his untruths." Id. 347 U.S. at 65, 
7 4 S. Ct. at 356. 
In the case at bar the defendant made certain 
statements to the police who recorded these state-
ments. Later on the stand the defendant affirmative-
ly claimed no such statements were made. A Miranda 
flaw should not give the defendant a shield to hide 
behind. 
Counsel for the defendant cites Miranda as au-
thority that statements taken in violation thereof can-
not be used to impeach the defendant's testimony. 
However, notice the carefully prepared opinion ot 
the Supreme Court of Ohio which has recently dealt 
with this problem. In that case the defendant was 
tried without a jury and the court held that the 
prosecution could use statements of an accused 
made to police without Miranda warnings, to impeach 
accused's credibility. The court then looked at 
Miranda as follows: 
"We do not believe that the case of 
Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. 
Ct. 1602, dictates a conclusion contrary to 
ours. In Miranda, the court indicated that 
statements of a defendant used to impeach his 
testimony at trial may not be used unless they 
were taken with full warnings and effective 
waiver. (384 U.S., at 477, 86 S. Ct. 1602.) How-
ever, we note that in all four of the convictions 
reversed by that decision statements of the 
accused, taken without cautionary warnings, 
were used by the prosecution as direct evidence 
of guilt in the case in chief. 
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"We believe that the words of Chief Justice 
Marshall regarding the difference between 
holding and dictum are applicable here. 
'It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that 
general expressions, in every opinion, are to 
be taken in connection with the case in which 
those expressions are used. If they go beyond 
the case, they may be respected, but ought not 
to control the judgment in a subsequent suit 
when the very point is presented for decision. 
The reason of this maxim is obvious. The ques-
tion actually before the court is investigated 
with care, and considered in its full extent. 
Other principles which may serve to illustrate 
it, are considered in their relation to the case 
decided, but their possible hearing on all other 
cases is seldom completely investigated.' Cohens 
v. Virginia (1821), 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 
399, 5 L.Ed. 257. 
"The court in Miranda, was not faced with 
the facts of this case. Thus, we do not consider 
ourselves bound by the dictum of Miranda." 
State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 
818 at 821-822 (1969). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUS 
ING TO GIVE AN INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTEE 
INSTRUCTION. 
Authorities generally agree that where partie: 
request jury instructions on lesser offenses, they art 
entitled to have instructions given upon their theol'J' 
of the case if there is any substantial evidence tc 
justify giving such an instruction. State v. Gillian, filec 
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January 8, 1970; State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 
P.2d 738 (1947); State v. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144 
P.2d 290 (1943). 
The State recognizes that under State v. Hymas, 
64 Utah 285, 230 P. 349 (1924), and State v. Gillian, supra, 
that it is a "delicate matter for a trial court to with-
hold" jury instructions of a lesser included offense, 
and the court may only do so in ''clear cases." Our 
argument, however, is that the case at bar is a "clear 
II case. 
All of the evidence in this case shows that 
there was an argument and a killing. This would 
lead one to believe there is a question of voluntary 
manslaughter. Instructions were given to the jury 
not only on voluntary manslaughter, but also on self 
defense. 
The defendant requested an instruction on in-
voluntary manslaughter. Under Utah law man-
slaughter is an unlawful killing of a human being 
without malice. Involuntary manslaughter is defined 
as follows: 
"Involuntary, in the co.lllIIllllsion of an un-
lawful act not amounting to a felony, or in the 
commission of a lawful act which might pro-
duce death, in an unlawful manner or without 
due caution and circumspection." Utah Code 
Ann.§ 76-30-5 (1953). 
The defendant places great weight upon the 
recent decision of this Court in State v. Gillian. That 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
case is clearly distinguishable. In tha.t case the de-
fendant killed a person who was in the same room 
as her 11 common law husband." She did not even 
know the person she killed was in the room. (State 
of Utah v. Iva Lee Gillian, Brief of Appellant at 5.) 
Being angry with her "common law husband" she 
fired several shots mto the room intending to scare 
him. One shot, however, struck and killed the hus-
band's roommate. As to this set of facts the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
"If the jury accepted her version of the 
occurrence, that it was in such a state of emo-
tional upset that she got the pistol and fired 
it into the room several times intending only 
to scare Miller, her offense could be found to 
be involuntary manslaughter in that it was a 
killing which resulted 'in the commission of an 
unlawful act not amounting to a felony.' ... " 
State v. Gillian, at 3. 
In other words, firing a gun merely to scare some-
one is an unlawful act not amounting to a felony. 
In the present case however, the defendant's own 
testimony was: "I just figured it was either him or 
me and I fired." (TR. 178). This statement goes to the 
question of self defense, not the question of 11 an 
unlawful act not amounting to a felony." 
Another difference between the Gillian case and 
the case at bar is the fact that in Gillian the trial court 
refused to give the jury instructions of the lesser 
offenses of second degree murder, voluntary and 
involuntary manslaughter; thereby lim1ting the 
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jury's decision only to two alternatives-guilty of 
first degree murder (with or without leniency) and 
not guilty. 
In the present case the jury was instructed that 
they could find the defendant guilty of murder in 
the second degree, guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter, or not guilty because of self defense. If 
the jury were disposed of believing that a lesser 
crime had been committed, they would have found 
the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter in-
stead of second degree murder. 
To find for the defendant, this Court must de-
termine that the defendant was committing a law-
ful act which might produce death, in an unlawful 
manner or without due caution; or find the defend-
ant's acts constituted an unlawful act not amounting 
to a felony. 
The evidence in this case simply will not sup-
port such a theory. The defendant had his gun be-
fore he saw his son with one. The defendant shot 
his gun to scare his son, or to force his son out of 
the house. Upon seeing his son with a weapon in 
hand the defendant shot. This was not by mistake. 
The case of State v. Gillian, supra, is not in point. 
In that case the facts were such that the court could 
determine a theory which would justify an instruc-
tion on voluntary manslaughter. In the case at bar, 
however, the problem is not one where there is an 
accidental killing but under the defendant's own 
theory a "square-off." 
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This is a "clear case" and the trial court correct-
ly determined as a matter of law that the evidence 
did not warrant an instruction of involuntary man. 
slaughter. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMIT· 
TING THE PROSECUTION TO EXAMINE THE DE· 
FENDANT'S PRIOR ACTS OF VIOLENCE. 
The Utah Supreme Court set out the test as to 
whether or not testimony is admissible in State v. 
Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961) as follows: 
". . . Where evidence has special relevancy 
to prove the crime of which the defendant 
stands charged, it may be allowed for that pur-
pose; and the fact that it shows another crime 
will not render the evidence inadmissible." Id. 
at 12, 361 P.2d at 415. 
In the case at bar the defendant took the stand 
and testified as to fights and other physical contact 
he had had with his son two years before the kill-
ing (TR. 172). He also testified that as a rule his gun 
was loaded (TR. 180). 
This testimnoy was used by the defendant to 
show that he was frightened by his son, and went 
to the issue of self defense. The defendant was the 
only person who actually knew what his own state 
of mind was, but there is a strong influence of sell 
interest, in statements like this. The following is 
found in Wigmore on Evidence: 
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"Testimony to one's own intention, or other 
state of mind, has often been attacked on the 
ground of what is really a disqualification by 
Interest; i.e. the argument is that, since a per-
son's own intention can be known only to him-
self, his statement of what it is or was cannot 
be safeguarded by the possibility of exposing 
its falsity, through the aid either of conflicting 
circumstances or of opposing eye-witnesses; and 
that thus the influence of self interest in falsi-
fying is too dangerous, and that such testimony 
should consequently be forbidden. This argu-
ment has been generally repudiated." Id. State 
of Mind § 1965 at 104. 
On a theory of self-defense, the prosecution has 
the right to question facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the defendant's st ate of mind. State v. 
Gillian, supra, is not in point. In that case the court 
pointed out that there was no indication that there 
was pre-existing animosity or "bad blood" between 
defendant and her "husband." 
In the case at bar, however, the defendant 
stated that he carried a loaded gun. Upon cross-ex-
amination the defendant was asked if he had 
threatened others with his loaded gun. This ques-
tion was asked for the purpose of showing his state 
of mind (TR. 183). The defendant was then asked 
whether or not he had threatened dogs or cats 
and he replied that he had several months prior. 
This question was not objected to by defense coun-
sel. The defendant then admitted threatening to 
shoot his oldest daughter and also getting out a 
deer rifle after a fight with his son (TR. 185). Threats 
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made by defendant against the life of deceased to 
show state of mind are generally admissible, and 
remoteness in time goes only to the weight. State v. 
Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P.2d 1003 (1944). 
As a rebuttal witness, the daughter of the de-
fendant testifL"d that her father had gotten his gun 
out of the car and was going to shoot the family cat 
and dog. Again no objection was made by defense 
counsel. This she testified, took place the afternoon 
before the shooting. This threw a cloud of credi-
bility on the statements by defendant. 
This type of evidence is admissible. The theory 
of the defendant is that there was self-def?nse in 
this situation or that somehow the defendant was 
committing an illegal act not amounting to a felony. 
Evidence which shows that there was "bad blood" 
between defendant and his son would inform the 
jury as to whether or not there was self-defense. 
Evidence which shows that the defendant contin· 
ually weilded a loaded weapon whenever he was 
angry, certainly informs the jury as to his state of 
mind in this case. This evidence does have special 
relevancy to prove the crime charged. It shows that 
the defendant entertained malice towards his son. 
The threats to others and to animals shows that the 
defendant continually made assualts with a loaded 
weapon which, being a felony under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-7-6 (1953), would eliminate involuntary 
manslaughter. 
Furthermore, the reception of this evidence was 
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not prejudicial to the defendant since he did not 
object to some of it. In light of the abundance of 
other evidence which connected him with the kill-
ing, it cannot be said that he suffered undue preju-
dice by the reception of this testimony. The Su-
preme Court must "give judgment without regard 
to errors or defects which do not affect the substan-
tial rights of the parties." Even if an error has been 
committed, there is no presumption of prejudice. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-42-1 (1953). 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE IS MORE THAN AMPLE TO SUP-
PORT A JURY VERDICT OF SECOND DEGREE MUR-
DER. 
In People v. Davis, 47 Cal. Rptr. 801, 408 P.2d 129 
(1965), there was a conviction of second degree 
murder. In that case self-defense was the defend-
ant's theory, and he claimed that there was insuf-
ficient evidence to support such a conviction. The 
Supreme Court of California held that the elements 
"may be implied from the circumstances of the 
homicide." The same is true in the case at bar. 
To convict this defendant of second degree 
murder the jury had to find that there was an un-
lawful killing with malice aforethought. "Malice," 
as applied to second degree murder, is the wish 
to do great bodily harm. The following summary 
of evidence (most favorable to the State) shows that 
the jury came to the proper verdict-second degree 
murder: 
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1. Defendant kept a loaded gun (TR. 180). 
2. Defendant got out a deer rifle after a figh! 
with his son (TR. 185). 
3. Defendant and his son had an argument 
which defendant started (TR. 226). 
4. Defendant went for his gun first (TR. 227). 
5. Defendant yelled 'TH kill you" (TR. 136). 
6. Defendant shot his gun in the ground or in 
the air (TR. 136). 
7. Defendant then saw his son with a gun and 
he shot his son, at a distance of two or three 
feet (TR. 223). 
8. The defendant stated to the police that he 
was too close to miss (TR. 222). 
9. The defendant stated to the police that "he 
had shot the boy and wasn't sorry" (TR. 99). 
Admittedly the above summary of evidence is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, bu! 
it does show that there was ample evidence whers· 
by the jury could find a verdict of second degree 
murder. In light of some of the impeachment testi· 
mony in this case, the jury found the proper verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
There were no errors committed by the trial 
court which would warrant a new trial. The Miranda 
warning was given and complied with. The court 
was correct in refusing the instruction of involun· 
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tary manslaughter. There was no error in allowing 
the prosecution to admit evidence which showed 
the defendant's state of mind. For the above stated 
reasons this case must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney 
General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
